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Introduction
Writing in the Law Quarterly Review in 1886, Frederick Pollock flatly described the rule in Rylands v Fletcher​[1]​ as a ‘duty of insuring safety’.​[2]​ In applying such a rule, he explained, ‘[t]he law takes notice that certain things are a source of extraordinary risk, and a man who exposes his neighbour to such a risk is held, although his act is not in itself wrongful, to insure his neighbour against any consequent harm not due to some cause beyond human foresight and control’. Pollock did not mean, of course, that the defendant who is held to such a duty must purchase insurance to cover the risk, but that the creator of the risk would, through liability, himself be an insurer, where that risk was ‘extraordinary’. In 1886, liability insurance was in its infancy and largely confined to the marine and employment contexts. Public liability insurance, which is today stand-alone cover for enterprises and almost universally provided under householders policies, was unknown when Rylands v Fletcher was decided. Rather, just as the employer would, soon, be regarded as ‘insuring’ liability towards his employees in the very nature of the Workmen’s Compensation Acts,​[3]​ so also Pollock presented Rylands v Fletcher as a form of insurance between neighbours. 
Strict liability is not all alike, and Rylands is different from Workmen’s Compensation. The latter required no breach of duty on the employer’s part. Rylands by contrast was conceptualised in terms of a duty on a user of land who accumulated things dangerous should they escape – that duty being a strict one, to ‘keep them in’. Neverthless, it was at its inception justified by ideas of risk creation and loss-bearing in cases where both parties were ‘free from all blame’.​[4]​ It is this which makes the ‘insurance’ description an appropriate one, and it is also this which has kept Rylands v Fletcher in the pages not only of textbooks but also of the law journals long after its promise in English law has faded away.​[5]​ In its contrast with liability based on fault, Rylands has even been described as the ‘conscience’ of the law.​[6]​ Here, we are concerned with the nature, and limited existence, of Rylands liability for damage done by fire at common law, in light of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Stannard v Gore.​[7]​ Highly pertinent to this discussion is the long-standing description of such liability in terms of ‘insurance’. It is relevant to contemplate whether there are downsides to ‘insurance’ through liability, when compared to the well-recognised and widespread practice in relation to fire, of insuring oneself.
Background: the decline of Rylands 
It is well known that the promise of Rylands has faded. The Court of Appeal’s judgment in Stannard continues this trend. The technical limitations initially applying to the rule – particularly the need for an accumulation, and an escape​[8]​ - have progressively taken priority over any underlying principle. The House of Lords in recent times has further restricted the rule by emphasising the need for foreseeability of harm;​[9]​ by emphasising the need for a ‘non-natural’​[10]​ or, now, extraordinary​[11]​ use of the land; and by determining that Rylands, since it is merely a branch of the law of nuisance, does not apply in cases of personal injury.​[12]​ In Transco v Stockport,​[13]​ Lord Hoffmann offered a measured appraisal of the underlying issue: 
‘so far as the rule does have a residuary role to play, it must be borne in mind that it is concerned only with damage to property and that insurance against various forms of damage to property is extremely common. A useful guide in deciding whether the risk has been created by a "non-natural" user of land is therefore to ask whether the damage which eventuated was something against which the occupier could reasonably be expected to have insured himself. Property insurance is relatively cheap and accessible; in my opinion people should be encouraged to insure their own property rather than seek to transfer the risk to others by means of litigation, with the heavy transactional costs which that involves. The present substantial litigation over £100,000 should be a warning to anyone seeking to rely on an esoteric cause of action to shift a commonplace insured risk.’​[14]​
There is continued resistance to the idea that insurance issues might play a serious part in the development of the common law,​[15]​ but it is suggested that the question identified here is a crucial one. If the basis of Rylands liability is an intuitive response about risk and loss-bearing, then the widespread existence of other mechanisms for dealing with that risk cannot be irrelevant. This is not to argue that insurance questions exhaust the issues; but if Rylands offers an alternative to fault liability we need to be clear about what sort of alternative it is, and how it relates to other, non-liability alternatives. A reference to Lord Hoffmann’s comments was pointedly included by Ward LJ in Stannard v Gore not in general discussion but as one of his conclusions, where it was described as providing the ‘moral of the story’: ‘make sure you have insurance cover for losses occasioned by fire on your premises’.​[16]​ 
We suggest that the underlying question is this: what is the relationship between a principle of justice based on the duty to keep things in and to insure one’s neighbour against harm, and the actual practice of insurance against the same risks? This question is particularly highlighted by the case of fire for the simple reason that fire insurance is so familiar and widespread, and because it is one of the longest established branches of insurance. It is not as old as liability for fire;​[17]​ but since fire insurance business developed quickly during the eighteenth century​[18]​ it is old enough to have run alongside the majority of the statutory and judicial developments which arise for consideration. We would add that insurance against fire has had a huge influence on the history of fire prevention (for example through creation of early fire brigades by insurers)​[19]​ and thus of public policy in respect of the relevant risks. 
In this article, we reflect on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Stannard v Gore, focusing particularly on what it shows about the nature of common law development in relation to one of the earliest and commonest of insured risks. The decision shows that an accretion of several centuries of extant legal principle can create a thicket of confusion. The problems are exacerbated where little guidance can be found in the materials, or in any contemporaneous accounts of the law, as to the social purpose of legal rules and competing interpretations. In those circumstances, judicial and legislative utterances fall to be interpreted with only the faintest sense of their connection either to principle or social purpose. Extracting principles of law fit for today’s purposes from such dry and tangled material is no easy matter. 
Stannard v Gore
A fire started on premises occupied by the defendant on a Trading Estate in Hereford. The defendant was in the business of supplying, fitting and balancing car and van tyres and, not surprisingly, kept supplies of tyres on the premises. The fire became intense and spread to neighbouring premises, where it caused damage to the claimant’s property. The claimant sought damages from the defendant in respect of the blaze. It has been reported that the claimant was uninsured.​[20]​ This resonates with Ward LJ’s analysis of the ‘moral of the story’;​[21]​ and with the near universal theme of early comments on the case;​[22]​ but the advice can hardly be said to be newly relevant. Common law liabilities, no matter what their basis, could not operate as a substitute for adequate fire insurance. A duty to insure your neighbour, almost inevitably, creates  “double” insurance in the sense that both parties are well-advised to insure.​[23]​ 
Initially the claim was brought in negligence and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The negligence claim failed. The Recorder found no evidence of negligence in maintaining the electrical system or appliances, which were the probable source of the fire. He found, however, that liability under the principle in Rylands v Fletcher was established. He considered that fire had ‘escaped’ from the premises, and that the accumulated tyres though not themselves flammable posed a special fire risk if ignited. The numbers of tyres and haphazard means of storage created a use that was out of the ordinary, and thus qualified as ‘non-natural’. The relevant criteria – accumulation of a dangerous thing; escape; and non-natural or extraordinary use – were thus held to be fulfilled.  
The appeal was solely concerned with Rylands liability. The Court of Appeal concluded that the elements of the action were not established, and thus allowed the appeal. In finding their way through years of competing authority, some of it binding, the Court chose to be guided by the most recent decisions of the House of Lords in relation to Rylands liability, which did not directly concern fire.​[24]​ It thus snuffed out a lingering sense that fire may be different, and stricter, than other cases dealt with under the rule. The Court held that there was no basis on which to apply different principles to cases of fire when approached as giving rise to liability under Rylands v Fletcher, except to the extent that in the opinion of Lewison LJ, an additional defence restricts such cases as a result of the venerable s 86 Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 (‘Section 86’). The content of section 86 and its nature are outlined below, and it offers a useful, if inconclusive focus in contemplating the role of insurance in relation to liability for fire.
Because the general principles set out in Transco were applied to the case of fire, members of the Court of Appeal thought it plain that as currently interpreted, the thing that escapes (here, the fire) must also be the thing that is accumulated. Nineteenth century cases of sparks flying from railway engines were capable of being rationalised, because the fire itself was created by the defendant railway companies and at the same time what escaped was ‘sparks’.​[25]​ There was no scope to hold, as the Recorder had done, that an accumulation of flammable things (tyres), combined with an escape of something else (fire) could form the basis of a claim under the rule in Rylands. A number of authorities will as a consequence need reappraisal.​[26]​ The tidy-minded will be somewhat relieved by this holding because, if the elements of Rylands liability are to be applied literally rather than purposively, the alternative is logically difficult, to say the least. Variations in the rule from one context to another need justification, and that is precisely what the law is struggling to provide in its present state. The implication however is broad: Rylands liability cannot apply in the case of fires which are started without intent or, at least, negligence.​[27]​ Ward LJ wondered if this was a remnant of the old law of ignis suus;​[28]​ but this opens up the difficult question of different streams of strict liability and their interpretation, and especially the relevance of Section 86. The Court of Appeal further held that in light of the approach in Transco, the storage of tyres in the context of the particular time and place was not ‘non-natural’; and cautioned that even if a fire is deliberately started on one’s land, this is of course capable of amounting to a ‘natural’ user of land. It seems the spread of fire from a natural use will now need to be dealt with in terms of negligence.
History and legislation
As already pointed out, the difficulties faced by the Court of Appeal involved history in a particularly dry legal form. Generations of courts had produced conflicting interpretations of the law and competing verbal formulae. Further, these decisions seemed to express overlapping causes of action whose relationship and interaction has never been wholly resolved.​[29]​ The difficulties were much exacerbated by the fact that the material to be interpreted has tended not to be underpinned by much information, or even judicial argument, about its social and policy context. Where the source material gives little guidance to the context and its influence, all that is left is the surface detail.
These difficulties are encapsulated in the question of how Rylands liability should be affected by s 86 Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774. The task of interpreting this section today demonstrates in an extreme form the problem of the disembodied legislative pronouncement, authoritative yet lacking in information about surrounding context or other guidance as to its function or basis.​[30]​ However, its interpretation by the various judges in Stannard v Gore also sheds light on our enquiry as to the nature of strict liability at common law for the spread of fire. 
Before the intervention of statute, the ‘custom of the realm’ was (and, therefore, is)​[31]​ that a person is liable for the damage caused by the escape of ‘his’ fire.​[32]​ This is the ignis suus rule. The applicable declaration, and some discussion of its uncertain meaning,​[33]​ was provided by Ward LJ at [26]:
Whereas by the custom of England a man is bound to keep his fire ignem suum safe and secure lest by default of custody of it loss should fall upon his neighbours in any way, the defendant tam negligenter ac improvide apud custodivit, quod pro defectu debitae custodiae the fire spread and did damage ….’.
Ward LJ reports, drawing on Winfield, that it is safe to assume that negligenter did not mean negligence in the modern sense. Most likely, the expression was intended to exclude liability where the fire spread or occurred through the act of a stranger, or by misadventure. 
That represents the law which was affected by the eighteenth century legislation. Section 86 Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 re-enacts an earlier provision, section 6 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1707,​[34]​ and provides:
‘No action, suit, or process whatsoever shall be had, maintained, or prosecuted against any person in whose house, chamber, stable, barn or other building, or on whose estate any fire shall accidentally begin, nor shall any recompense be made by such person for any damage suffered thereby, any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding’.
The section remains in force and is not restricted to London. What does it mean, and what was its purpose? The answers, unfortunately, are obscure. The section is one of only two surviving provisions from the 1774 statute. That statute was, as its name suggests, concerned with the pressing issue of fire prevention. It was major legislation, including many regulatory interventions into the nature of permitted building methods. Insurance was at the forefront of the legislation, and insurers were at the forefront of fire prevention. Included in the earlier 1707 Act, for example, was a provision entitling members of the fire brigades operated by insurance companies to avoid the press-gang, up to a certain number (thirty).​[35]​ The only other surviving section of the 1774 Act, s 83, is an insurance provision. S 83 requires  insurers (on request of interested parties) or permits them (upon the basis of suspicion of fraud), to cause insurance monies to go towards the rebuilding or reinstatement of buildings. It is expressly aimed at deterring the practice of setting insured buildings on fire and thus clearly at avoiding both fraud, and fire. Its operation has recently been the subject of review by the Law Commission, on the basis that its current uses are rather different.​[36]​ The section was originally desiged to prevent fraud by weekly tenants who had no continuing interest in the building but had nevertheless insured it: the section thus permitted insurers to reinstate rather than to hand over any insurance proceeds (assuming of course that they could not prove fraud, in which case nothing would be payable anyway) and required insurers to reinstate if requested to do so by the landlord, mortgagee or other interested person.  By contrast, in the histories of fire prevention and fire insurance of the period, the provision on civil liability does not appear to be considered significant.​[37]​ This contrasts with evidence of enthusiastic printing and circulation of the 1707 Act in order to emphasise criminal penalties attaching to servants who started fires.​[38]​ We can only dimly glean the purpose of the provision.
From today’s perspective, it may appear counter-intuitive that a statute providing for enhanced fire prevention should contain a provision to reduce the prospects of recovery against those on whose premises fires begin. As explained, the legislation took a close interest in insurance. The key is that ‘insurance’ at this stage was synonymous with first party insurance. There is reason to doubt whether the provision would have been thought by insurers to increase their burden or remove any avenue for redress on their part.​[39]​ Ogus points out that an insurer’s right of subrogation (the right to bring an action against a party who is liable for the harm for which the insurer has indemnified its assured to recover sums paid) was recognised in the case of marine insurance in 1748,​[40]​ and though it was first applied to a case of fire insurance in 1782,​[41]​ that was an unusual case where there was an alternative indemnifier (the local community). Once recognised, he suggests, the right was rarely invoked in this period.​[42]​ Where insurance means first party insurance, the result of cutting down liability is to enhance insurance coverage of losses, not to undermine it. 
For the Court of Appeal in Stannard v Gore, two questions about s 86 were of relevance: what is the meaning of the provision, and what is its applicability to Rylands liability? The first of these questions was treated as answered by Denman CJ in Filliter v Phippard.​[43]​ Though the word ‘accidentally’ in some contexts falls to be interpreted as contrasting with ‘wilful’,​[44]​ in this context it was more ‘reasonable’ to assume that a distinction between accidental and negligent was intended. The reason offered by Lord Denman CJ was that this would avoid ‘encouragement’ to carelessness, which might otherwise be created by the section. Plainly, Lord Denman saw the section as effecting significant change in the law, sufficient for him to see the need to limit its effects.​[45]​ This frankly retrospective and purposive application of presumed legislative intent has become the accepted interpretation, and s 86 therefore bars actions, where it applies, in relation to fires which are not deliberately or negligently started.​[46]​ 
The second question is whether Rylands liability is thought to be free of the defence, and if so why. Ward LJ may have regarded this question as settled by the Court of Appeal in Musgrove v Pandelis,​[47]​ despite being otherwise deeply sceptical about the case, which he interpreted as being very much confined to its facts – and indeed, to its time; although Ward LJ also stated on the basis of Lord Tenterden’s judgment in Becquet v MacCarthy​[48]​ that ‘one can surmise’ that the purpose of the section was to remove a presumption of negligence .​[49]​ On this basis, s 86 does not apply to liability under Rylands v Fletcher, which is an independent source of strict liability, not a development of ignis suus. Etherton LJ felt able to conclude that the formulation of Rylands liability in cases of fire in Musgrove v Pandelis was wrong because it was inconsistent with Transco, which was intended to be comprehensive and did not leave scope for a special rule relating to fire. However, he maintained that its interpretation of the non-applicability of section 86 was binding, and added that as a matter of statutory interpretation, there is in any case a presumption against interference with the common law. He too was convinced by the argument that s 86 was enacted specifically in order to deal with certain limited areas of uncertainty in relation to the customary law of ignis suus, which in his view was conceptualised as different from Rylands liability. The provision was treated as designed to resolve particular doubts about the reach of ignis suus. Both Etherton LJ, and Ward LJ, therefore adopted the approach to section 86 proposed by Ogus: it merely clarified which fires would come within the ignis suus principle.​[50]​ While Ward LJ ‘surmised’ that this was the case, Etherton LJ saw ‘no reason to disagree’ with that analysis. 
By contrast, Lewison LJ embarked on a substantial analysis of the point. He identified that the statutory provision was widely stated and clearly expressed to apply notwithstanding law and custom to the contrary. It was demonstrably intended to change the law, not just to clarify it, and was expressed accordingly. Further, he argued that it was incorrect to argue that Rylands liability was sharply different from the customary law encapsulated as ignis suus. There was no distinction between a ‘mere escape of fire’ and an escape under Rylands v Fletcher conditions. Referring to the Law Commission’s 1970 Report on Civil Liability for Dangerous Things and Activities,​[51]​ he pointed out a dilemma: either Rylands was based on a generalisation of liabilities of a type which had previously been recognised, including the law relating to fire, in which case the statutory defence should apply; or it stated a new form of liability, in which case it ought to be seen as ‘limited by the mandate of parliament’, and should not be allowed to evade the settled position. Lewison LJ produced persuasive authorities to support this rival interpretation.​[52]​ Short of finding new historical evidence of the thinking behind the statutory provision, any contribution to the debate is only likely to produce more of the same.​[53]​ What then are the implications?
Implications
It is plain that Rylands will only in a rare case present a route to redress in cases of fire. Applying the criteria recognised by the House of Lords in Transco, and treating Musgrove v Pandelis as either specific to its facts,​[54]​ or as turning on negligence,​[55]​ or as simply unsustainable after Transco,​[56]​ the fire that escapes must be the thing that is also accumulated. Fires created without either intention or negligence, even in relation to dangerous things, are as a consequence not within the rule. Doubt is thereby cast, for example, on the statement in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, that ‘a fire does not begin accidentally when it is caused or produced by a dangerous thing for which the owner is responsible under the doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher’ (the basis for an argument that s 86 does not apply in Rylands cases).​[57]​ Rather, we must now reason in the other direction: the necessary accumulation and escape are both of fire; and Rylands does not apply to a fire because it is ‘caused or produced by’ a dangerous thing. This is a new understanding of Rylands in cases of fire, produced by following the logic of Transco. But would it have been more satisfactory to use the statutory route preferred by Lewison LJ? There are two routes to the same restriction, but while the confinement of Rylands through the notions of escape and accumulation has come to turn on technicalities, the statutory alternative raises the question of purpose and intent. The latter would be the more satisfactory, if only these questions could be resolved.
In both Stannard and Transco as we have seen, senior judges have been prepared to clarify the effect of their decisions in terms of loss-bearing and insurance. The English courts are not alone in drawing attention to the pattern of insurance in relation to fire. In countries where global warming is leading to a hotter rather than a wetter climate, and bush fires are a real and growing threat, litigation around fire damage has been more significant and on a larger scale. In a recent Tasmanian decision dealing with much more recent legislative provisions, and in the different context of a negligence action against state fire authorities for alleged failings in fighting a fire, the court made plain the loss-bearing agenda:
“At least in relation to property damage, legislation in this State since 1920 had reflected a policy that the financial burden of unfortunate operational decisions should be borne by insurers, or by the uninsured. That seems possibly to have been a quid pro quo for the State providing fire-fighting services which, in times long past, were provided by insurance companies, and not at the expense of the public.”​[58]​
Unfortunately the purpose of s 86 and its predecessor cannot be so confidently stated. But the effect – that the financial burden of fires in the absence of fault falls on a category which can be captured as ‘insurers or the uninsured’ - remains the same. The key points here are that first party insurance against fire is the norm; and that no liability recipe could be concocted which would remove the need for such first party insurance against a familiar risk. Whilst arguments that insurance is irrelevant to tort reasoning or at least ‘fraught with difficulty’ are, as we have seen, still encountered,​[59]​ where the principle in question is recognised to be one of insurance and loss-bearing it is highly relevant to consider familiar insurance patterns against which that principle must operate. This does not threaten to demolish the common law principles but calls attention to their purpose. What is needed for Rylands liability to be appropriate is a sufficient reason for placing the loss with the creator of a risk.
That was not the case in Stannard v Gore, nor will it now be the case in other circumstances where a fire begins without intention or negligence. That insurance provides the context of such cases is underlined not only by Ward LJ’s remarks and by the various commentaries published in response to the decision, but also by the response of the defendant to the Court of Appeal’s decision.  Underlining the impact of insurance, and suggesting also some of its possible advantages over strict liability between neighbours, Mr Stannard is reported as having said that he was unaware of the Court of Appeal hearing. “I thought I was cleared some time ago so this makes no odds to me, but I am pleased it has all come to an end. I hope everyone affected by the fire is alright because they are all friends at the end of the day”.’​[60]​
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